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INTRODUCTION 
Although the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace is 
nothing new, its pervasiveness had managed to remain severely 
underreported when in October 2017, a Twitter post encouraged 
women to reply “me too” if they had been subject to sexual assault or 
harassment.1  Within 24 hours, the #metoo had been used millions of 
times on social media, igniting what has since been dubbed the 
“#MeToo movement.”2  The Twitter post came in the wake of a New 
York Times article exposing allegations of sexual assault made against 
media mogul, Harvey Weinstein.3 
In the following weeks, additional allegations were made against 
Weinstein, and against other powerful men in entertainment, politics 
and other industries.4  As the allegations mounted, it came to light that 
Weinstein had entered into a number of nondisclosure agreements 
(“NDAs”) with his accusers that prevented them from speaking out 
about the alleged behavior.5  Similar agreements were used to prevent 
details of sexual misconduct allegations leveled against Bill O’Reilly 
from being publicized.6  The media coverage of allegations made 
against these and other powerful men, along with the initial flood of 
posts on social media, encouraged more women to speak up about the 
sexual misconduct to which they have been subjected, and raised 
questions about how this kind of behavior has continued to be 
unexposed.  This increased scrutiny on how companies7 respond to 
sexual harassment allegations has had a cognizable impact in a 
relatively short period of time.  In the past two years, companies have 
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 1.  L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement Too?, 22 
EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 321, 321–22 (2018). 
 2.  See id., at 321 (noting that the post had been shared over 500,000 times on Twitter and 
over 12 million times on Facebook). 
 3.  Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 229, 230–31 (2018). 
 4.  Id. at 231–33. 
 5.  Id. at 234. 
 6.  See Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a 
Model, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 121, 133–34 (2018) (describing how the cost of O’Reilly’s various 
settlement agreements paled in comparison to the revenue he generated for Fox News). 
 7.  This Article uses the term “company” as a general label referring to all organizations, 
public or private, for-profit or otherwise. 
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had to grapple with a new reality in which a failure to adequately 
respond to allegations of sexual harassment invites negative publicity, 
as well as potentially serious reputational damage. 
A few years earlier, in another corner of the legal world, the media 
began reporting that a natural gas company had stated that it would 
enforce an NDA, which had been included as part of a settlement 
related to hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), against the minor children 
whose parents had brought the suit.8  Not surprisingly, the idea of a 
natural gas company enforcing a gag order on children under ten 
brought notoriety to the case and drew attention to the use of NDAs 
in the context of fracking.  However, despite the media coverage of this 
unusual situation, it does not appear to have diminished the use of 
NDAs in this context, nor did it prompt a significant backlash against 
the industry.  Although the use of fracking9 to stimulate wells has taken 
place since the 1940s, combining it with horizontal drilling techniques 
in the late 1990s revolutionized the energy extraction industry.10  Vast 
unconventional shale reserves, which had previously been considered 
economically unfeasible for extraction, are now accessible.11  
Consequently, the United States has seen a considerable increase in 
natural gas production since the early 2000s.12  However, this 
development has not been without controversy.  A vocal anti-fracking 
movement has emerged, arguing that fracking poses a serious threat to 
human health and the environment.13  Critics cite a myriad of concerns 
including air pollution, surface and groundwater pollution, dangerous 
truck traffic, road damage, noise, and earthquakes.14  Proponents of 
fracking conversely argue that many of these claims are anecdotal and 
that studies definitively connecting fracking activities to water 
 
 8.  Don Hopey, Hallowich Children Not Part of Marcellus Shale Gag Order Agreement, 
PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:00 AM), https://www.post-
gazette.com/local/washington/2013/08/07/Hallowich-children-not-part-of-Marcellus-Shale-gag-
order-agreement/stories/201308070133.  
 9.  The term “fracking” is used to refer to all activities associated with unconventional shale 
gas development – from drilling to well plugging – and not merely the injection of fluids 
underground at high pressures to stimulate wells.   
 10.  Adam Garmezy, Balancing Hydraulic Fracturing’s Environmental and Economic 
Impacts: The Need for a Comprehensive Federal Baseline and the Provision of Local Rights, 23 
DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 405 (2013). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 405–06. 
 13.  John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and 
Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 998 (2013). 
 14.  Id. 
Lonnquist Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:53 PM 
286 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:283 
contamination, for example, are lacking.15  Nevertheless, a number of 
lawsuits have been filed, alleging, among other things, negligence, 
nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, arising out of claims of bodily 
injury or property damage.16 
Although fracking has become a household word thanks to the 
documentary “Gasland,” the movie “Promised Land,” and the 
involvement of celebrities, such as Mark Ruffalo,17 the issues remain 
relatively unpublicized.  This may be due to the fact that fracking’s 
impacts are inherently local.    On the contrary, sexual harassment 
would seem ubiquitous. The #MeToo movement not only cast light on 
how pervasive sexual misconduct is in the workplace,18 but also drew 
attention to the legal, cultural, and psychological mechanisms that 
conspire to keep that pervasiveness hidden.  Scholars who have 
analyzed the settlement of sexual harassment claims have articulated a 
number of negative repercussions arising from the widespread use of 
NDAs in these circumstances, including shielding illegal behavior and 
externalizing harm to third parties.19  This Article uses interview data 
to demonstrate that systematic inclusion of NDAs in fracking 
settlements similarly obscures public awareness of a threat to public 
health and safety and renders the tort system unable to properly serve 
its goals of deterrence and compensation.  It goes on to propose that 
NDAs in the context of fracking should only be enforceable subject to 
a partial disclosure requirement to ensure safety-related information 
regarding the harm at issue is made available to the public, while 
keeping the parties’ identities private. 
These interviews were taken in July and August 2018, with 
individuals who live in Pennsylvania communities in which fracking 
 
 15.  See David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs. Cool 
Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 141, 145 (2013) (saying that in response to environmental 
concerns, proponents of fracking “point to the paucity of hard data supporting opponents’ claims, 
dispute the anecdotal evidence opponents cite, and respond with their own exaggerated claims”). 
 16.  Megan S. Haines, Hydraulic Fracturing and Related Activities as Giving Rise to Classic 
Tort Claims in Pennsylvania, 87 PA. BAR ASS’N. Q. 103, 103–04 (2016). 
 17.  Lauren Pagel, Hollywood Comes to Washington to Talk Fracking, EARTHWORKS (Feb. 
18, 2011), https://earthworks.org/blog/hollywood_comes_to_washington_to_talk_fracking/.  
 18.  This Article focuses on sexual harassment in the workplace and uses the terms “sexual 
harassment” and “sexual misconduct” interchangeably with the intent of being comprehensive. 
 19.  See Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 
25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 700 (1999) (discussing examples where nondisclosure prevented 
whistleblowing which could have “avoided serious danger and considerable harm to product 
users, bystanders, and the general public”); David A. Hoffman & Eric Lampmann, Hushing 
Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 214–15 (2019) (stating that nondisclosure agreements in 
sexual harassment settlements should not be legally enforceable, simply as a matter of public 
policy). 
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activities have taken or are still taking place.20  The interviews were 
structured with the intent to gather information about individuals’ 
perceptions of the legal system as a means to compensate injuries 
allegedly caused by fracking.  It was only towards the end of the 
interview collection process, and particularly during the transcript 
analysis, that parallels to the #MeToo movement became apparent. 
Widespread use of NDAs to settle claims related to sexual 
harassment and fracking has managed to frustrate important legal 
principles in surprisingly similar ways.  Although NDAs are commonly 
used as part of settlements in other areas of law, this Article focuses on 
sexual harassment and fracking in particular because both contexts are 
divisive and politicized, and those who make allegations often face 
retaliation or social ostracization for doing so.  Such concerns are less 
prevalent in other contexts, such as products liability and medical 
malpractice.  Furthermore, shedding light on how such similar 
consequences can arise in these two dissimilar contexts illustrates a 
fundamental problem with allowing contracts of silence to restrict the 
availability of information vital to public health and safety. 
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes how courts have treated 
sexual harassment claims pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.  It then provides an outline of the legal landscape governing 
fracking, before discussing the contract law principles that apply to the 
enforceability of nondisclosure agreements.  In Part III, the 
repercussions of using NDAs to suppress information regarding sexual 
misconduct allegations are juxtaposed with interview data discussing 
NDA use in the fracking context.  Part IV of the Article then analyzes 
solutions that have been proposed to address the negative 
repercussions of NDA use in the sexual harassment context and 
provides recommendations for the fracking context based on this 
analysis.  Finally, Part V concludes this Article by considering how 
these recommendations might apply to NDAs in other contexts. 
I. Relevant Law and Policy 
A. Information as a Regulatory Tool 
Citizens being empowered to make informed decisions is a 
bedrock principle of democracy.21  The right to receive information 
 
 20.  Interviewees agreed to participate on the condition of anonymity.  Each has been 
assigned a unique ID number, and all additional personal information has been excluded. 
 21.  See Elizabeth A. Aronson, The First Amendment and Regulatory Responses to 
Workplace Sexual Misconduct: Clarifying the Treatment of Compelled Disclosure Regimes, 93 
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furthers several important interests.22  For example, the Supreme Court 
recognized the public’s right to commercial information that helps 
them make choices affecting their health and enjoyment of life.23  
Along similar lines, public policy favors protecting individuals against 
unknown risks and ensuring that they have sufficient information to 
make risk-based decisions.24  Assumption of the risk theories in tort 
law reflect this principle, recognizing that visitors to a landowner’s 
property who are unaware of any potentially hazardous conditions are 
not necessarily able to prepare for them.25  Similarly, when the public 
has limited access to relevant information, environmental hazards will 
tend to escape detection, risking harm to human health that might 
otherwise have been avoided.26 
Mandating the disclosure of information about risks to human 
health or the environment thus furthers the individual liberty interests 
inherent in being able to make informed decisions about one’s own 
wellbeing and risk tolerance.27  At the same time, information 
disclosure laws have begun to emerge as a favored regulatory tool in 
areas as diverse as corporate finance, nutrition labeling, and 
environmental law.28  This increased transparency leaves the disclosing 
entities vulnerable to reputational damage for perceived negative 
behavior, thus incentivizing positive behavior without the inefficiencies 
inherent in command-and-control schemes.  Allowing market forces 
and public opinion to complement or displace government regulation 
eases the burden on both the government and the regulated entities.29  
 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2018) (arguing that “because disclosure improves the ability of 
citizens to make informed decisions, it may help to ensure a healthy, functioning democracy, a 
key interest underlying the First Amendment”). 
 22.  See Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know, 39 ECOLOGY 
L. Q. 989, 1007 (2012) (saying that a “right to know information regarding the environment may 
also further important liberty interests”). 
 23.  See Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 762–63 (1976) (discussing how society’s value in the free flow of commercial information 
relating to prescription drug prices is related to “the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment 
of basic necessities”). 
 24.  Roesler, supra note 22, at 1009. 
 25.  Keith N. Hylton, Tort Duties of Landowners: A Positive Theory, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1049, 1055 (2009). 
 26.  Sarah Lamdan, Beyond FOIA: Improving Access to Environmental Information in the 
United States, 29 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 481, 483 (2017). 
 27.  See Roesler, supra note 22, at 1010. 
 28.  ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE 75 (2007) (describing obstacles to 
effectiveness in information disclosure models from different industries). 
 29.  David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A 
Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 383 (2005). 
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So, although compelled speech is generally disfavored, mandatory 
disclosure of information relating to public safety risks has been 
embraced as part of larger regulatory schemes.30 
B. Title VII and Sexual Harassment 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate against any individual because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.31  Because sexual harassment differs 
qualitatively from the kind of discrimination contemplated by Title 
VII, at least with respect to the other protected categories, it was not 
immediately clear whether sexual harassment fell within the purview 
of the Act.32  But in 1986, the Supreme Court held that “[w]ithout 
question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of 
the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of 
sex.”33  Relying on the language used in Title VII, the Court thus 
established the requirement that the harassment must have been 
“because of sex” in order to fall within the purview of the Act.34  The 
Court went on to state that for harassment to be actionable, it must be 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s 
employment, creating a hostile or abusive work environment.35 
In a subsequent ruling, the Court further clarified that to be 
actionable under Title VII, the harassment needs to be both objectively 
and subjectively severe.36  That is, it must be “an environment that a 
reasonable person would consider hostile or abusive,” and the victim 
must have subjectively perceived it to be so.37  The Court would revisit 
the “because of sex” requirement in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
 
 30.  See Aronson, supra note 21, at 1210–12 (discussing mandated disclosure of sexual 
misconduct information within a regulatory framework). 
 31.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
 32.  See Tippett, supra note 3, at 237 (saying that although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 “contains no explicit reference to harassment,” the Supreme Court would go on to 
recognize “harassment as a form of discrimination” in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 
(1986)). 
 33.  Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64.   
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 66–67. 
 36.  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (“Conduct that is not severe or 
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment 
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, 
if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not 
actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”).   
 37.  Id. 
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Services, Inc.,38 holding that while the conduct need not be motivated 
by sexual desire, the victim does need to demonstrate that it amounts 
to discrimination because of sex.39  The Court was clear in Oncale, 
however, that Title VII was not to be interpreted as a code for 
workplace civility.40  Harassment between men and women does not 
automatically implicate Title VII, even if the words have sexual 
connotations.41  There must be discrimination because of sex, as the 
text of Title VII makes plain.42 
The Court has further clarified that employer liability pursuant to 
Title VII varies and depends on whether the harasser is a supervisor or 
a co-worker.43  “If the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the 
employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working 
conditions.”44  Negligence in this context can be established by showing 
that the employer failed to provide a means for filing complaints, failed 
to respond to those complaints, or discouraged employees from filing 
complaints.45  On the other hand, if the harassing employee is the 
victim’s supervisor, the employer is strictly liable if the harassment 
culminated in a tangible employment action.46  A tangible employment 
action includes things “such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable 
reassignment.”47  In such instances, an employer is liable regardless of 
what steps it took to prevent the conduct or whether it had any 
knowledge of the misconduct.  If no tangible employment action is 
taken, an employer is still presumed liable.  The employer, however, 
may avail itself of an affirmative defense, sometimes referred to as the 
Faragher/Ellerth defense, “that (1) the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the 
plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or 
corrective opportunities that the employer provided.”48 
 
 38.  523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 39.  Id. at 80–81. 
 40.  See id. at 80 (emphasizing that the statute “does not prohibit all verbal or physical 
harassment in the workplace. . .” instead foreclosing harassment on the basis of sex). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See id. at 448–49 (saying that these actions would be relevant to a determination of 
negligence in such a case). 
 46.  Id. at 424. 
 47.  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).   
 48.  Vance, 570 U.S. at 424; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) 
(applying the same elements of the affirmative defense). It is also worth noting that empirical 
research into sexual harassment reporting suggested that the Faragher and Burlington opinions 
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Scholars have criticized sexual harassment jurisprudence on a 
number of grounds, including the degree to which the Supreme Court 
standard for what constitutes harassment is open to interpretation by 
lower courts.49  Another concern is that the Faragher/Ellerth 
affirmative defense is functionally reactive, rather than preventative, 
and allows employers to be shielded from liability arising from an 
initial harassment complaint.50  Similarly, as has come to light through 
the #MeToo movement, a significant number of instances of 
harassment can be attributed to serial harassers.51  Thus, courts likely 
need to reconsider what constitutes reasonable employer efforts to 
correct harassing behavior.52  Furthermore, from a plaintiff’s 
perspective, the second prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense fails to 
account for the difficult circumstances that give rise to the myriad of 
reasons some victims fail to make a claim promptly.53 
C. Fracking-Related Lawsuits 
Plaintiffs have brought dozens of common law tort claims in 
response to injuries allegedly sustained due to fracking operations.54  
Most of the claims arise out of the contamination of groundwater.55  
Plaintiffs in these suits typically rely on private wells for drinking water 
and allege that those wells became contaminated shortly after 
defendants’ drilling operations began.56  Although many causes of 
action have been alleged as part of water contamination suits, 
prominent among them are private nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence.57  Some plaintiffs have also brought strict liability claims, 
asserting that fracking constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity, 
 
overestimate how straightforward a reasonableness analysis would be. See Mindy E. Bergman et 
al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences of Reporting Sexual 
Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 230, 237 (2002) (finding that reporting can lead to retaliation, 
“lowered job satisfaction and greater psychological distress,” leading some to decide not to 
report). 
 49.  Tippett, supra note 3, at 239–40. 
 50.  Id. at 240–41. 
 51.  Hébert, supra note 1, at 332; see generally Nancy Chi Cantalupo & William C. Kidder, 
A Systematic Look at a Serial Problem: Sexual Harassment of Students by University Faculty, 3 
UTAH L.J. 671 (2018) (examining the issue of serial harassment in the university setting).   
 52.  Hébert, supra note 1, at 332.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Michael Goldman, A Survey of Typical Claims and Key Defenses Asserted in Recent 
Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 305, 306–07 (2013). 
 55.  Id. at 308. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See id. at 310–15. 
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one in which liability may arise even when a defendant has exercised 
the utmost care.58  Although these common law tort claims have 
yielded predictably mixed results, the difficulty of proving causation 
has emerged as a common theme.59 
A number of factors combine to make causation difficult to prove 
in toxic tort cases, including difficulties identifying a specific harmful 
agent, identifying its source, determining exposure and dose, and doing 
so after a potentially long latency period.60  In fracking tort cases, 
plaintiffs must also wrestle with the fact that some substances, such as 
methane, are naturally occurring in the water near drilling.  Reliable, 
adequate baseline testing is not always conducted prior to drilling.61  
This situation makes it difficult for plaintiffs to establish that the 
methane had not been present prior to drilling.62 
D. Use of Nondisclosure Agreements to Settle Claims 
1. Torts and Settlement 
Generally speaking, damages in tort are awarded to serve two 
primary goals: (1) making the injured party whole by returning the 
party to the state it was in prior to the tortious conduct; (2) and 
deterring that tortious conduct by penalizing it.63  In theory, these goals 
should work hand in hand and can be achieved through jury verdict or 
settlement.  Public policy favors settlement as it tends to increase 
efficiency, reduce cost, and speed resolution.64  This principle is woven 
 
 58.  See, e.g., Berish v. Southwestern Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D. Pa. 2011). 
 59.  See Monika Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive Response to 
Opposition Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States, 46 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 423, 436–37 (2014) (stating that causation was, in 2014, difficult to prove). 
 60.  See Kellie Fisher, Communities in the Dark: The Use of State Sunshine Laws to Shed 
Light on the Fracking Industry, 42 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 99, 113 (2015) (“Causation in a toxic 
tort case can be difficult to prove because of latency periods between exposure to the substance 
and the onset of illness, identifying the source of contamination, and identifying the specific 
toxin.”).  
 61.  Id. at 114. 
 62.  Chemists can distinguish, however, between the surface level methane that naturally 
appears in well water and the methane from deep underground that is brought to the surface as 
part of the gas extraction process. See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of 
Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 20 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172 (2011).  
 63.  C.f. Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public Interest, 13 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 232 (2008) (“Genuine tort reform, then, seeks to make the tort system 
better at accomplishing its existing goals, particularly deterrence and compensation.”). 
 64.  R. Kyle Alagood, Settlement Confidentiality: A “Fracking” Disaster for Public Health 
and Safety, 45 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10459, 10463 (2015). 
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into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which encourage settlement 
at various points of litigation proceedings.65 
There has been an increasing trend towards settlement, or perhaps 
any resolution other than a trial.66  Although there is some debate 
about the precise rate of settlement, research confirms that the 
majority of cases do settle, and tort actions have the highest rate of 
settlement.67  Given the time, expense, and risk of trial, it is not 
surprising that parties prefer to resolve the matter before it reaches 
that point.  Furthermore, settlements allow for more flexibility in their 
outcomes, increasing the chances that parties will resolve disputes in a 
manner that is acceptable to each side.68  These negotiations often 
factor in interests that go beyond the litigated issues, and are not 
necessarily limited to binary, zero sum outcomes.69 
2. Contracts and Secrecy 
A settlement is a legally enforceable contract between two private 
parties.  Freedom to contract is a foundational principle of American 
law, and it allows individuals to voluntarily enter into agreements with 
the expectation that the government will not sanction them for doing 
so and courts will enforce the terms of those agreements.70  Thus, while 
settlement is subject to the laws and public policy considerations that 
govern contracts, courts will generally refrain from interfering, 
provided the agreement meets the requirements of a legally 
enforceable contract.71  Therefore, nondisclosure agreements 
(“NDAs”), in which one party offers consideration in exchange for 
 
 65.  Id.; see also Laurie Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in 
the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 289 (1999) (“In short, civil process in this 
country is increasingly diverting time and resources away from trial and adjudication toward 
pretrial activities and settlement.”). 
 66.  See Dore, supra note 65, at 288 (“In federal court alone, the proportion of filed to tried 
cases has declined by four-fifths over the last fifty years . . . .”).  
 67.  Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should 
We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 145–46 (2009). 
 68.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2672–73 (1995) 
(emphasizing the benefits of settlements and negotiated compromises). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom to Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 263, 287 (1999) (explaining the relationship between the traditional view of freedom and 
freedom of contract). 
 71.  Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of Silence 
Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2513–14 (2018) (emphasizing that courts only decline to enforce contracts in 
limited circumstances). 
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another party’s silence, are permissible exercises of the freedom to 
contract.72 
Settlement agreements often contain nondisclosure provisions 
that restrict parties from disclosing the terms, amount, or even 
existence of a settlement.73  Courts are willing to enforce such 
provisions under the theory that one or both parties’ interest in privacy 
will aid in resolving the dispute more quickly.74  Furthermore, plaintiffs 
in a position to offer silence in settlement negotiations can end up with 
a better outcome.75  That bargaining chip can induce defendants to 
settle more quickly and for higher amounts to avoid reputational harm.  
Likewise, some scholars argue that allowing parties to settle their 
disputes privately is in the interests of justice: defendants should not 
have to abandon their privacy rights, and be forced to disclose 
damaging information, simply because they have been pulled into 
litigation.76  In fact, this principle can apply to both parties, particularly 
in the context of sexual misconduct, where a plaintiff may desire 
privacy to avoid the stigma and negative publicity that can accompany 
that type of allegation.77  Plaintiffs’ desire for privacy in this context has 
been highlighted by recent litigation tactics employed by universities 
to force sexual assault claimants to abandon their anonymity for their 
lawsuits to proceed.78 
3. Nondisclosure Agreements to Settle Fracking and Sexual 
Harassment Claims 
Tort suits arising from injuries allegedly caused by oil and gas 
activities are usually settled outside of court, and those settlements 
almost always contain an NDA.79  In fact, the general understanding is 
that oil and gas companies will refuse to settle without plaintiffs signing 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Dore, supra note 65, at 386. 
 74.  Tippett, supra note 3, at 253–54. 
 75.  See Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don’t Know 
Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115, 118 (1999) (“It makes intuitive sense that 
it will be more difficult for a plaintiff to settle a case with a defendant if the defendant knows that 
it is no longer allowed to protect the dangerous practice it engages in behind a secret veil.”). 
 76.  Id. at 117–18.  
 77.  Prasad, supra note 71, at 2516. 
 78.  Anemona Hartocollis, Colleges Challenge a Common Protection in Sexual Assault 
Lawsuits: Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/college-sexual-assault-anonymous.html. 
 79.  See Tyler White, A “Minor” Problem with Oil and Gas Company Settlement Agreements, 
5 LSU J. OF ENERGY L. & RES. 209, 212 (2017) (stating that settlements of these types of cases 
typically contain confidentiality clauses). 
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extensive NDAs that not only prohibit discussion of the settlement 
terms, but also discussion of fracking in general.80  NDAs may also be 
a condition of any kind of financial compensation paid to landowners 
complaining directly to gas companies, even if a suit is never filed.81  
These NDAs usually bar the plaintiff from discussing the terms of the 
settlement, as well as the conditions or complaint that led to it.82  In the 
Hallowich case referenced in the Introduction, as part of the out of 
court settlement for injuries allegedly resulting from noxious air 
emissions and water contamination, the Hallowich family agreed “to a 
joint statement of confidentiality, whereby they will not make any 
statements or comments, directly or indirectly, to any third party 
regarding the well operators, oil and gas development, fracking, their 
experience with any of the well operators or oil and gas companies, 
natural gas drilling or other operations, or Marcellus Shale activity.”83  
Of course, the inability to discuss the terms of the settlements makes it 
difficult to determine whether such an expansive NDA is typical or an 
aberration. 
Similarly, many settlements resolving sexual harassment claims 
also contain NDAs,84 which can serve to protect both the reputation of 
the company, and also that of the harasser.85  Widespread use of NDAs 
prevents women who have been harassed from coming forward, 
allowing perpetrators to continue engaging in sexual harassment.86  
More importantly, NDAs not only make it difficult to identify the 
pervasiveness of harassment by a particular individual or at a particular 
company, they also cloud the extent of harassment across the board.  
That is, NDAs serve to depress the statistics on sexual harassment, 
making it more difficult to galvanize support for policy changes.87  For 
those individuals who do avail themselves of the legal system to 
respond to sexual harassment, the systematic use of NDAs diminishes 
their ability to recover in court.  Proving claims in court has shown to 
 
 80.  See Fisher, supra note 60, at 119. 
 81.  See id. at 116 (stating that settlement agreements need not be filed with a court and are 
generally sealed).  
 82.  Id. at 119. 
 83.  Id. at 118. 
 84.  Margaret Ryznar, #MeToo & Tax, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 53, 54 (2018). 
 85.  Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 134. 
 86.  See id. (emphasizing that victims will have less information and be less able to find 
corroborative witnesses to support their claims).  
 87.  Ryznar, supra note 84, at 55–56 (discussing a case where the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission pursued an injunction against NDAs that were impeding on the 
Commission’s ability to gather information). 
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be difficult in sexual misconduct cases.  For a woman to successfully do 
so, being able to identify other women who have had similar 
experiences can be crucial.88  Without such corroboration, a victim may 
face a he-said-she-said situation in which she is unlikely to prevail.89 
4. Enforceability of Nondisclosure Agreements 
The potentially harmful repercussions of using NDAs to restrict 
information dissemination have raised questions about their 
enforceability.  Because NDAs are contract provisions, their 
enforcement is subject to the same public policy exception as any other 
contract provision.  Although courts may be loath to interfere with 
private parties’ freedom to contract and its accompanying 
expectations, they have recognized public policy exceptions that can 
render some contracts or their provisions unenforceable.90  Section 178 
of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that term of a contract 
is unenforceable on policy grounds if “the interest in its enforcement is 
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the 
enforcement of such terms.”91 
The Restatement thus establishes a balancing test in which courts 
are to weigh (1) the preservation of the parties’ justified expectations, 
(2) forfeiture that would result, and (3) any special public interest in 
enforcing the term against (a) the strength of the policy pursuant to 
legislation and judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that non-
enforcement will further that policy, (c) the seriousness and 
deliberateness of any misconduct involved, and (d) the connection 
between the misconduct and the term in question.92  Section 179 of the 
Restatement further clarifies that public policy may be derived from 
legislation or the need to protect the public welfare.93  Thus, the 
determination hinges not on the benefit to the party seeking the 
determination, but rather based on whether enforcement of the 
provision would be detrimental to the public welfare.94 
Courts, however, must proceed cautiously, and exercise this power 
to void contract provisions only in cases that are clear and free from 
 
 88.  Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 134. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  McCracken v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 896 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 91.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. § 179. 
 94.  McCracken, 896 F.3d at 1172. 
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doubt.95  That is, the public policy at issue must clearly outweigh the 
general policy interest in favor of enforcing contract terms.96  Few 
situations are as clear as when a statute specifies that a provision or 
contract is void under certain circumstances.97  Florida’s Sunshine in 
Litigation Act, for example, voids as a matter of policy any agreement 
that conceals a public hazard.98  Arkansas has a similar rule, which 
states that “[a]ny provision of a contract or agreement entered into to 
settle a lawsuit which purports to restrict any person’s right to disclose 
the existence or harmfulness of an environmental hazard is declared to 
be against the public policy of the State of Arkansas and therefore 
void.”99  These statutes plainly establish public policy exceptions to the 
freedom to contract. 
This kind of clear legislative mandate is rare, however, and courts 
can look to the Restatement balancing test as a guide for what may 
qualify as a public policy exception to enforceability.100  This balancing 
test leaves some room for interpretation and will vary somewhat based 
on each state’s contract law and public policy concerns. Further 
complicating the analysis is the ever-changing nature of the values that 
inform public policy.101  Although one court may interpret this inherent 
variability as inviting judges to bring to bear their own interpretation 
of what constitutes relevant public policy, another may see it as reason 
to exercise restraint under such circumstances.102 
Despite this potential divergence of opinion, there have been 
certain categories of public policy concerns that have prompted courts 
to exercise their power to invalidate a contract provision on the basis 
of public policy.  More specifically, courts have been increasingly 
willing to scrutinize NDAs, the enforcement of which could put public 
health and safety at risk.  For example, a Connecticut court identified 
the importance of patients’ interests in hospitals having access to full 
 
 95.  Combs v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 991, 996 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 96.  McCracken, 896 F.3d at 1172. 
 97.  Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 296 (1998). 
 98.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 99.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122(a) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 100.  Garfield, supra note 97, at 296. 
 101.  Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 94–95 (N.J. 1960) (stating that “[a] 
contract, or a particular provision therein, valid in one era may be wholly opposed to the public 
policy of another”). 
 102.  See Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning Comm’n v. Washington Nat’l Arena, 386 
A.2d 1216 (Md. 1978) (resolving a contract dispute after “[h]aving examined each of appellee’s 
public policy contentions in some detail” and “balanc[ing] these policy considerations against 
those weighing in favor of enforcing [the contract]”). 
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information when hiring nurses or other medical personnel.103  
Similarly, an Ohio court of appeals determined that “an employment 
separation agreement clause purporting to prohibit a school district 
from disclosing pedophilia on the part of a teacher to a school district 
that subsequently employs him is void as against public policy.”104  
Finally, in the products liability arena, courts have tended to permit 
employees to testify against their employers, despite being subject to 
NDAs.105  Products liability settlements have often been sealed or 
subject to protective orders which, predictably, masks the extent of 
problems with a given product.106 
Some scholars have argued that NDAs preventing the disclosure 
of environmental risks to public health and safety should be void as 
being against public policy.107  The reasoning is similar to that in other 
types of litigation: while an NDA might be in the best interests of the 
litigating parties, it does not take into account other members of the 
public whose ignorance of the environmental hazard at issue may 
ultimately lead to additional injuries.108  However, some have pointed 
out that the other branches of the government are tasked with 
protecting the public from environmental hazards, and therefore 
courts should not set about doing so by upending contractual 
expectations.109  But that argument fails to consider that agencies and 
legislatures need accurate information to craft laws and regulations, 
and allowing private parties to stifle the flow of information via 
contract subverts public policy.110  In fact, to fulfill its stated mission of 
protecting human health and the environment, EPA works to ensure 
that “[a]ll parts of society  -- communities, individuals, businesses, and 
state, local and tribal governments -- have access to accurate 
information sufficient to effectively participate in managing human 
 
 103.  Giannecchini v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006 (Conn. Super. 2000). Although the 
court ultimately did not void the NDAs in question, that holding was in deference to state statutes 
that spoke to the issue. Id. 
 104.  Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 666 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
 105.  Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of Nondisclosure Agreements to Silence 
Whistleblowers, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (1999). 
 106.  David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2650 
(1995). 
 107.  See Alagood, supra note 64 (arguing against the use of confidentiality agreements and 
for a presumption of “openness”). 
 108.  See Dore, supra note 65, at 369 (“[T]oxic torts involving damage to the environment or 
hazardous substances affect a class of individuals broader than the immediate litigants.”). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Alagood, supra note 64, at 10465. 
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health and environmental risks.”111  Similarly, Congress, through the 
enaction of numerous environmental laws, has demonstrated that 
protecting public health and safety from environmental risks is its 
responsibility, and NDAs that interfere with that responsibility should 
be scrutinized and are potentially unenforceable as against public 
policy.112 
With regard to Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit held that a 
court should not automatically seal settlements merely because the 
parties so request it.113  Instead, a court should only do so if the parties 
demonstrate good cause, by establishing with specificity a clearly 
defined injury that failure to seal will inflict on one or both parties.114  
Although the court was deciding whether to seal a settlement 
agreement, rather than enforce the terms of a private settlement, it did 
acknowledge in a footnote that provisions of silence in private 
agreements may be unenforceable if they violate public policy.115  
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit recently appeared to take a more 
cautious approach when considering the exception to contract 
enforcement: “[p]ublic policy is . . . ascertained by reference to the laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed 
public interest.”116 
This interpretation seems more in line with the traditional view of 
the public policy exception, namely that such a policy should be 
derived from statute or case law.  However, Article I, Section 27 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution states that “[t]he people have a right to 
clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment.”  The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania explained that “[t]his clause places a limitation on the 
state’s power to act contrary to this right, and while the subject of this 
right may be amenable to regulation, any laws that unreasonably 
impair the right are unconstitutional.”117  That the right to clean air and 
water is enshrined in Pennsylvania’s constitution suggests that there is 
 
 111.  Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
 112.  Amie Sloane, Secret Settlements and Protecting Public Health and Safety: How Can We 
Disclose with Our Mouths Shut?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 61, 70 (2004). 
 113.  Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d. Cir. 1994). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 788 n.21. 
 116.  Lupu v. Loan City, LLC, 903 F.3d 382, 393–94 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Hall v. Amica Mut. 
Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (1994)). 
 117.  Pennsylvania Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 931 (Pa. 2017). 
Lonnquist Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:53 PM 
300 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:283 
an argument for courts voiding contract provisions that, were they to 
be enforced, pose a threat to these constitutional rights. 
Scholars have also argued that NDAs that restrict the flow of 
information about sexual misconduct should be void as against public 
policy.118  The reasoning is similar to that in the environmental context: 
NDAs allow additional parties to be injured, investigations are 
undermined by the reduced availability of witnesses, and policymakers 
have diminished ability to develop policies to protect the public.  
Although enforceability of NDAs has not been extensively litigated,119 
several states, including California, New York, and Pennsylvania, have 
considered or passed legislation to address the issue in the sexual 
harassment context.120  In fact, California has largely rendered 
unenforceable most NDAs related to sexual harassment claims filed in 
court or in an administrative proceeding.121 
II. Convergence of Sexual Harassment and Fracking Claims 
Some scholars have conceptualized the use of NDAs as a situation 
in which the parties enter into bargains that internalize the benefits and 
externalize the costs.122  That is, one party ends up with money, the 
other with reputation-saving silence, but third parties remain at risk for 
the harm that gave rise to the settlement in the first place.  In both the 
sexual harassment and fracking contexts, information about harm is 
suppressed by a variety of legal, cultural, and psychological 
mechanisms.  Without this information being made available, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify and punish repeat offenders, 
leaving them free to continue harming others.  Furthermore, unless 
policymakers are aware of the extent and severity of these issues, they 
cannot enact the kind of policies that would better deter bad behavior 
or compensate those who have been harmed.  As the following 
discussion demonstrates, the negative repercussions that arise from 
limiting public access to risk information, particularly through the 
systematic use of NDAs, are not merely theoretical, but very real. 
Another means of ensuring that information about sexual 
harassment claims does not become public, alongside NDAs, is the use 
of mandatory arbitration clauses.123  Since 2000, organizations have 
 
 118.  E.g., Prasad, supra note 71, at 2509. 
 119.  Garfield, supra note 97, at 263. 
 120.  Tippett, supra note 3, at 255. 
 121.  Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 19, at 188. 
 122.  Id. at 199. 
 123.  Prasad, supra note 71, at 2508 n.5. 
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increasingly conditioned employment on employees signing forced 
arbitration clauses, which forces sexual harassment victims to take 
their claims to arbitration, rather than allowing them to litigate them.124  
Use of this kind of private forum diminishes claimants’ abilities to 
identify witnesses who might lend credibility to their claims, which can 
tilt the arbitration outcome in favor of the employer.125  Thus, claimants 
not only struggle to prevail on their claims, but the proceedings do not 
become part of the public record, which shields harassers from more 
significant consequences.126  Forced arbitration clauses also appear in 
leases that landowners sign with gas companies.  “[W]ell, that’s one of 
the things that the early contracts had that any dispute had to be 
arbitrated.  So you could not sue.”127  Use of arbitration agreements in 
this context serves the same purposes of maintaining secrecy and 
stacking the deck in favor of the gas company. 
A. Economic Discrepancies Between Parties 
Research suggests that victims of sexual harassment are 
disproportionately the most economically vulnerable employees.128  
This means people who cannot afford to lose their jobs or face 
retaliation are less likely to speak up and are more likely to be subject 
to prolonged harassment.129  Similarly, those who have alleged water 
contamination issues arising from fracking activities are often 
disproportionately economically disadvantaged individuals living in 
rural areas.130 
Although topography and the location of extractable gas certainly 
play a role, those with less income have stronger economic incentives 
to lease their land and are less able to effectively mobilize opposition 
 
 124.  See generally ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION (2017) (discussing survey results which show a drastic increase in 
forced arbitration clauses). 
 125.  Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 135. 
 126.  See id. (asserting that companies use mandatory arbitration agreements to prevent 
lawsuits from entering the public record and to shelter known harassers). 
 127.  Interview with study participant 1101 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 128.  See Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 139–40 (claiming that those who are more frequently 
targeted for harassment have “an intense reliance on their wages and a foreboding sense that they 
cannot afford to lose their job.”). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Cf. Emeka Duruigbo, Fracking and the NIMBY Syndrome, 26 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 227, 
249–50 (2018) (“[O]pposed projects. . . are moved from affluent neighborhoods to low income, 
less politically sophisticated and vulnerable communities who then face all the negative 
consequences of these projects.”). 
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to fracking in their community if they are concerned about its risks.131  
Therefore, the burdens of fracking are disproportionately borne by the 
rural poor, despite the fact that not everyone in a community benefits 
directly from these activities.  Many people in these communities do 
feel as though they are treated differently due to their social economic 
status.  “And that clearly meant they did not care about public opinion 
in this area.  We are not real people, we are Appalachians, we are 
boneheads or whatever, we are backwoods -- which is ironic because 
even though Pittsburgh with CMU and all these high-class institutions, 
anywhere outside here, we’re just part of that northern Appalachian 
culture.  I mean it seems like that’s the assumption.  That’s what I’m 
feeling.”132 
Because many of the people who can afford to pay for silence are 
wealthy, powerful individuals who can also afford prolonged 
litigation,133 many sexual harassment victims feel their only recourse is 
to accept a settlement that includes an NDA.134  Residents in rural 
Pennsylvania are similarly well aware of the dilemma created by the 
power asymmetry between the gas companies and the landowners.  
“Well, this is hardscrabble stuff -- these are people who couldn’t afford 
to retain a lawyer to help an individual or even a group.  And so they 
feel like they’re stuck.  They don’t have the resources to stand up 
against the drillers, and the drillers say the only chance you’ve got to 
get anything from us is to sign this non-disclosure agreement.”135  One 
farmer, who brought suit against a gas company after animals on her 
farm began dying shortly after drilling commenced both on and 
adjacent to her property, lamented that it took years before her 
neighbors admitted to losing livestock at the same time she did.  When 
asked why they took so long to say anything, she replied that the 
mentality of many farmers was simply to accept the losses and refuse 
to discuss it.  She speculated that they did not want to risk the 
consequences of complaining “[b]ecause of the gas company.  You 
can’t fight the gas company, it’s like fighting the phone company.  I 
mean, seriously.”136  Awareness of the power asymmetry discourages 
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Interview with study participant 1014 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 133.  Mimi A. Akel, The Good, the Bad, and the Evils of the #MeToo Movement’s Sexual 
Harassment Allegations in Today’s Society: A Cautionary Tale Regarding the Cost of These Claims 
to the Victims, the Accused, and Beyond, 49 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 103, 111 (2018). 
 134.  See Prasad, supra note 71, at 2539 (discussing why some victims may feel they have no 
bargaining power and thus no choice when presented with an NDA). 
 135.  Interview with study participant 1701 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 136.  Interview with study participant 1104 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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many of those harmed from considering litigation a realistic option.  As 
a result, they are often willing to accept unsatisfying settlements, 
provided they decide it is worth bringing a claim in the first place. 
B. Privacy Concerns 
As noted above, one of the arguments in favor of allowing settling 
parties to contract for secrecy is that, in certain contexts, both parties 
value privacy.137  In the sexual harassment context, the accused have a 
clear motivation to avoid having their reputations damaged by the 
allegations, but accusers often prefer to have potentially embarrassing 
and traumatic details of their treatment kept private, as well.138  They 
may also wish to avoid the stigma that can come with being victimized, 
as well as the fear that future employers might view them as litigious.139  
Although people who allege water contamination issues might have 
less powerful incentives for wishing to keep settlements secret, the 
divisiveness of the fracking issue does motivate some people to prefer 
to keep these issues to themselves.  For many who live in rural 
communities, fracking has brought much needed income, and they 
respond negatively to those who complain about it or bring lawsuits. 
The whole thing with people who lease, it’s like they’re not the 
enemy to me.  I mean, I’m the enemy to them, I understand that. . . . 
[T]hey don’t want me messing with their source of income.  I 
understand that, you know, it’s like if they had experienced the health 
impacts --140 
Even those who, out of concern for their neighbors’ safety, alert 
them of problematic water test results, run the risk of being ostracized. 
[W]hen we were told by the health department, ‘look, you’ve got 
arsenic in your water, you really need to contact your neighbors around 
you and tell them you have arsenic in your water maybe they’ll get 
there water tested too.’  Okay.  I called the neighbors.  Guess what.  I 
would have been better off to have leprosy.  Because from then on, it 
was like none of them wanted to talk to you.  Didn’t want to hear it.  
Don’t talk about your water.141 
 
 137.  See Prasad, supra note 71, at 2516 (discussing the benefits of NDAs not only to 
perpetrators, but also to victims of sexual abuse). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Interview with study participant 1437-A in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 141.  Interview with study participant 1104 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
Lonnquist Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:53 PM 
304 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:283 
Given how contentious the fracking issue has become in these 
communities, being able to settle without any publicity might be 
preferable for many residents. 
But even to the extent that some plaintiffs might benefit from 
being able to keep details about the settlement, or even its very 
existence, from being publicized, NDAs usually bestow 
disproportionate benefits on the more powerful party by allowing them 
to limit their liability for misconduct.142  Plaintiffs in these situations 
give up the right to speak about their experiences, while defendant 
companies save themselves any economic damage that might flow from 
subsequent harm to their reputations. 
Prior to the #MeToo movement, companies considered settlement 
of harassment claims to be just another cost of doing business,143 and it 
was worth paying out more money in a settlement in exchange for an 
NDA if they viewed the employee accused of sexual harassment to be 
sufficiently valuable.144  But doing so weakens any internal disciplinary 
measures because an economically valuable executive might opt to 
leave for a competitor, rather than endure any kind of discipline.145  
Thus, knowing that the company would not want to risk the publicity 
that would come with disclosing the behavior to that competitor, a 
sufficiently powerful harasser might escape any serious repercussions.  
However, as the #MeToo movement has brought so much publicity to 
the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace, companies have 
been forced to consider whether the public relations backlash from 
keeping a known perpetrator on staff is worth whatever economic 
value he might add.146 
In the fracking context, many residents feel as though the gas 
companies are making a similar calculation.  That is, they feel as though 
gas companies are using NDAs to avoid the negative publicity that 
would come with litigation, and to keep the extent of the water 
contamination issues from being discovered.  “[T]hey want to be 
portrayed as a good neighbor.  They don’t want their crap being out on 
‘60 Minutes’ every hour, or the news station: ‘oh, this company 
 
 142.  Ryznar, supra note 84, at 56. 
 143.  Tippett, supra note 3, at 272. 
 144.  See Hébert, supra note 1, at 324 (asserting that companies chose to ignore harassment 
because they “saw the harms caused by sexual harassment as not sufficient to counterbalance the 
benefits to those companies provided by the harassers”). 
 145.  Tippett, supra note 3, at 279. 
 146.  Hébert, supra note 1, at 324–25. 
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poisoned this residence down here.’  They don’t want that.”147  But just 
as companies might see NDAs as a means of limiting negative publicity 
should a landowner’s water be contaminated, the media backlash 
generated by their application to minor children in the Hallowich case 
surely serves as a cautionary tale.148 
C. Enabling Future Harm 
Regardless of whether one views NDAs as something nefarious or 
simply pragmatic, their systematic inclusion in settlements arising from 
sexual harassment and fracking claims inevitably restricts the flow of 
important information, giving rise to some of the policy concerns 
Section 178 of the Restatement contemplates.  “It’s a way of 
controlling the information that could get out about harm and so you 
know, how do you find out about nondisclosure agreements?  How do 
you, unless somebody is gonna in confidence say, ‘here’s what I had to 
sign’?  But they have legal repercussions if they violate that.  That’s a 
pretty good system, isn’t it?”149  One of the clear drawbacks of the use 
of NDAs in sexual harassment settlements is that by preventing 
accusers from speaking out about the alleged conduct, it is difficult to 
establish patterns, and thus perpetrators are able to continue engaging 
in this behavior with minimal external consequences.150  NDAs thus 
function as a shield that protects perpetrators from the kinds of 
investigations that might reveal repeated misconduct.151  Many 
landowners living near fracking operations voiced similar concerns 
about the potential for more injured parties.  “I feel like it’s wrong -- it 
gives gas companies an out.  It shuts people up, and then they can just 
keep doing what they’re doing.  And the story never gets out.  So more 
people are going to be harmed because of the people who have been 
harmed not being able to tell their story.  So I don’t even think they 
should be allowed to get away with that.”152  NDAs prevent external 
accountability, allowing similarly injurious behavior to continue. 
Unsurprisingly, the potential for additional parties to be harmed 
is the primary criticism of the systematic use of NDAs in these types of 
 
 147.  Interview with study participant 1104 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 148.  See Hopey, supra note 8 (discussing the decision made by shale gas companies to 
retroactively remove minor children from an NDA after experiencing PR issues as a result). 
 149.  Interview with study participant 1005 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 150.  Ryznar, supra note 84, at 54–55. 
 151.  Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 77 (2018). 
 152.  Interview with study participant 1014 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
Lonnquist Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:53 PM 
306 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:283 
settlements.153  Even in a situation where both parties sincerely value 
the privacy afforded by including a nondisclosure provision in the 
settlement agreement, those privacy interests do not take into account 
the potential impact on third parties.  That is, while public policy does 
favor the freedom to contract, there is a countervailing policy argument 
against contracts of silence that suppress information about threats to 
public health and safety.154  So, for example, the parties to a sexual 
harassment settlement might benefit from agreeing to remain silent, 
but that silence does not take into account the interests of any potential 
future victims who might then be at risk of being similarly victimized. 
While many victims of sexual harassment have very compelling 
reasons for preferring to avoid publicity, others wish to speak about 
their experiences for the benefit of others.155  The same can be said of 
those harmed by fracking operations. 
Do you think, I mean seriously, do you think that company has 
enough money for me to keep my mouth shut?  It will not happen.  If 
I could prove them wrong, … our attorney was talking about 
nondisclosure agreement, keep your mouth shut.  But I was like, ‘you 
better start adding friggin’ zeros and we’ll talk about it, but until then 
no.’  Why should other people suffer?156 
While the victims of sexual harassment might be cognizant that an 
NDA could enable a perpetrator to harm other employees, the 
offending conduct can feel intensely personal.  As a result, they might 
not necessarily assume that the perpetrator inevitably poses a risk of 
future harm to others.  In the fracking context, on the other hand, 
contaminated water is not personal, nor is it subject to social or 
behavioral constraints.  Thus, it is easier for a landowner to assume that 
the substances that contaminated her well also pose a direct threat to 
others nearby. 
So the next people, they’re signing a lease and they don’t know 
that maybe the guy next to them or two blocks away got sick, and can’t 
tell them because they’re under non-disclosure -- so you don’t get the 
 
 153.  See generally Ayres, supra note 151. (asserting that NDAs protect repeat offenders and 
thus future victims are not adequately warned). 
 154.  Bast, supra note 19, at 700. 
 155.  See Taishi Duchicela, Rethinking Nondisclosure Agreements in Sexual Misconduct Cases, 
20 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 53, 65 (2018) (detailing the potential repercussions that victims of sexual 
assault may face for speaking out, but how speaking out can help protect the public from their 
harassers in the future). 
 156.  Interview with study participant 1104 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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benefit of what your neighbors experienced.  So, basically, I think the 
system’s very bad to allow that.157 
D. Discouraging Claims 
In addition to enabling future harm to third parties, using NDAs 
to reduce information availability can ultimately discourage injured 
parties from engaging with the legal system to seek redress.  Awareness 
that others have suffered similar sexual harassment encourages victims 
to take steps to address it.158  Sexual harassment is a circumstance that 
lends itself to a first-mover disadvantage, in that the first accuser faces 
a he-said-she-said credibility contest that can be stacked in favor of the 
accused.159  A first line of defense against an accusation of sexual 
harassment is to dismiss the accuser as “vindictive” or “crazy,” and 
then ignore the accusation entirely.160  Such a response halts the 
proceeding, and can even cause victims to doubt whether the 
misconduct they suffered was, in fact, harassment.161  An expectation 
of being dismissed and demonized discourages victims from coming 
forth unless they know there will be other victims to corroborate their 
claim.162  Thus, because NDAs prevent victims from being aware of the 
experiences of others, they are less likely to avail themselves of the 
institutions that have been put in place to address this type of 
misconduct. 
Several interviewees reported having their concerns bluntly 
dismissed when they called gas companies about the problems fracking 
operations were causing, and more than one spoke of combative 
representatives answering helpline calls.  They suspected that this 
behavior was a calculated first hurdle intended to discourage residents 
from continuing to seek assistance.  Being dismissed in this way can, 
and does, undermine individuals’ confidence in their own experiences.  
One resident, who had dealt with a litany of issues arising from a 
wellpad on an adjacent property, sincerely asked at the conclusion of 
her interview whether she was the only one experiencing the types of 
problems she had described. 
 
 157.  Interview with study participant 1014 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 158.  See Ian Ayers & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145, 160–61 
(2012) (explaining why victims of sexual assault often feel more comfortable bringing claims if 
others do so at the same time). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Hébert, supra note 1, at 323. 
 161.  Ayers & Unkovic, supra note 158, at 161. 
 162.  Id. at 160–61; Hébert, supra note 1, at 329; Akel, supra note 133, at 113. 
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Not knowing that others are experiencing similar issues 
discourages injured parties from engaging with the legal system to seek 
remedies, in part because they cannot learn from others’ experiences.  
Some residents openly acknowledged that they did not know what 
steps they could take if they suspected that their water had been 
contaminated, and one complained that NDAs kept people from 
realizing that they might consider consulting an attorney and filing suit.  
She went on to say that “the fact that there’s settlement means they’re 
admitting to something but they’re not taking responsibility totally.  
And then it discourages others from suing or doing whatever they need 
to do.”163 
E. Reducing Public Awareness of the Issue’s Pervasiveness 
Another consequence of the widespread use of NDAs is that they 
impact statistics in a way that makes these issues seem less pervasive 
than they really are.164  Without accurate reporting on the frequency of 
a particular occurrence, policymakers are less likely to understand its 
severity, and the need to take steps to address it.  One outcome of the 
#MeToo movement was to shed light, not only on the pervasiveness 
and severity of sexual harassment, but also on the failure of the state 
to protect its citizens.  The subsequent legislative response, in which 
several states proposed bills to curtail the negative repercussions of 
NDAs,165 demonstrates that politicians will respond to pressure from 
constituents.  But enough constituents need to be aware of a problem 
to demand governmental action.  Even then, some remain skeptical 
about government action, regardless of context.  “The only good thing 
about having city water, I think, is if a lot of people’s water is affected, 
then you might be able to get more action than if just a single well was 
affected.  However, I don’t know if the people in Flint would agree.”166 
With NDAs contributing to artificially lowered sexual harassment 
statistics, at least a certain portion of the population was unaware of 
the ubiquity of the problem.  However, once stories of harassment 
began to spread on social media, ignorance of the issue could no longer 
justify a failure to address it.  NDAs have, in all likelihood, similarly 
depressed statistics on water contamination issues that have arisen 
from fracking.  Without information on claims and settlements, 
industry supporters continue to claim that there have been no proven 
 
 163.  Interview with study participant 5_1143 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 164.  Ryznar, supra note 84, at 55. 
 165.  Id. at 56; Tippett, supra note 3, at 255. 
 166.  Interview with study participant 1003-A in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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incidents of fracking causing water contamination.167  Yet several 
interviewees made reference to gas company employees casually 
referencing their culpability in contaminating water wells.  One 
interviewee had reached out to a gas company representative about her 
water concerns after drilling began, “and the guy said, ‘oh you know 
what, I’ve only ever known five water wells going bad because of us.’  
Like, that’s enough.  That’s enough.  I mean that’s enough.  He’s like, 
‘oh you’ll be fine.’”168 
Not surprisingly, some residents in Pennsylvania feel as though the 
use of NDAs is part of a larger, aggressive effort to minimize public 
awareness of the harms of fracking. 
No, no, they’re not really going to court, they’re being paid off and 
then forced to sign non-disclosure agreements.  The gas industry knows 
full well that they’re contaminating these wells, and when they do, 
people come to them and they say “here, we’ll mitigate the issue, we’ll 
give you a bunch of money, but you can’t talk about it now.  Because if 
you do, we’re gonna sue the hell out of you. We have millions of 
dollars’ worth of lawyers that we will stick on you, and it’ll be awful.”  
They’re threatening, they’re violent, they’re vicious, it’s nasty.169 
This reaction is common among interviewees who have either 
made a complaint to a gas company, or know others who have.  “I think 
it’s just a cover-up.  I don’t think it should be allowed, I feel like there’s 
probably so much we don’t know and they’re shutting people up.”170  
But even to the extent that gas companies include NDAs only in an 
attempt to stave off a flood of spurious claims by opportunistic 
landowners, rumors that companies are paying for silence will 
inevitably arouse suspicion and concern.  “Yeah, I’ve often wondered 
how many people in Butler County have litigated.  I often wondered 
that when I’m driving through the countryside, like okay how many of 
these people have had their wells contaminated, and no one is ever 
gonna know?”171 
 
 167.  See, e.g., Susan Owen, Rick Perry says there’s no proven instance of groundwater polluted 
by fracking, POLITIFACT, 
https://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2012/feb/29/rick-perry/rick-perry-says-theres-no-
proven-instance-groundwa/ (examining a politician’s statement that there was not a single proven 
case of groundwater being polluted by hydraulic fracking). 
 168.  Interview with study participant 1233 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 169.  Interview with study participant 1519 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 170.  Interview with study participant 1233 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 171.  Interview with study participant 1437-A in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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F. Controlling Narratives 
Without reliable information on the frequency or severity of harm, 
the more powerful party can seize control of the narrative in a way that 
maintains the status quo.  In the sexual harassment context, incidents 
that come to light involving repeat offenders can still be characterized 
as one-off issues if the other victims are contractually bound to silence.  
Likewise, the difficulty victims have in recovering in court can be 
touted as evidence that the claims were spurious.  Statistics that 
significantly underreport the frequency of harassment incidents can be 
wielded as evidence that the problem is insignificant or under control.  
Finally, individual accusers can be dismissed as crazy, vindictive, or 
overly sensitive, as they have no one to corroborate their claims.172  
Each of these narratives either undermines an accuser’s credibility, or 
suggests that these incidents are few and far between, which allows a 
harasser or the company for which he works to retain a (relatively) 
unblemished reputation.  The #MeToo movement exposed the 
perfidiousness of this narrative, galvanizing both the public and 
policymakers as a result.173 
Narratives play a similarly important role in shaping the fracking 
debate, some of which bear strong resemblance to those used in the 
sexual misconduct context.  For example, some residents in 
Pennsylvania feel as though NDAs are deliberately used to minimize 
the publicity surrounding water contamination issues, which in turn 
preserves the gas companies’ ability to dismiss these issues as 
exceptions to otherwise sterling records of safety. 
Well that way nothing can get out of the bag that the industry does 
or continues to do to people.  And if people aren’t allowed to talk about 
it then everyone thinks that everything is fine.  Or what’s worse yet is 
if you know people who have gag orders, people say ‘oh well that’s just 
one person,’ or ‘that’s just a handful of people who have gag orders.’174 
Conveniently, NDAs ensure that no one knows how many NDAs 
are in effect, nor the extent to which that impacts residents’ views on 
the issue.  Several interviewees did, in fact, believe that the gas industry 
had a good record of safety, and was only responsible for a few water 
contamination incidents.  “Now there could be one off the wall thing 
where something happened and you could complain about it, but 
 
 172.  See Hébert, supra note 1, at 329 (detailing ways that the character of an individual 
accuser may be maligned). 
 173.  See id. at 329–30 (describing how the experiences shared in the #MeToo movement are 
contrary to the narrative that accusers are themselves blameworthy). 
 174.  Interview with study participant 1556 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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there’s always 1, 2, 3% of somebody that’s never gonna be happy no 
matter what.”175  It goes without saying that the absence of information 
leaves individuals to draw their own conclusions, which some would 
argue is the point of NDAs in this context. 
Furthermore, pro-fracking interviewees consistently 
characterized complaints about degraded water quality as cynical 
attempts by landowners to exploit the deep pockets of the gas 
companies.  “Yeah, the methane’s been there the whole time.  They 
just -- now they can blame it on somebody.  Now they can say ‘hey, it’s 
your fault.’  No, you could always light that water on fire.  You could 
always do it -- it wasn’t because of them.”176  “But here comes these big 
oil and gas companies, and they’ve got cash.  And a lot of people are 
thinking this is a cash cow, and I’m gonna get some of it.  And they 
fabricate stories.”177  Similar accusations arise in the sexual harassment 
context as well, with victims’ attempts at seeking justice being 
dismissively characterized as cynical schemes to make money.178 
Another opinion that pro-fracking, anti-regulation interviewees 
all had in common was that no matter the activity, there will always be 
people who find something wrong with it.  “So you’re always gonna 
have somebody that they could repave the road and one guy would say 
‘well, there’s bumps there’ or something.  You know -- you know what 
I mean?  You’re always gonna have somebody that’s not gonna agree 
with it, but if it enriches 95% of the people instead of 5% of the people, 
wouldn’t that be better?”179  “Everybody -- anybody that doesn’t 
understand the whole dynamic can pick out a little piece here and there 
and say this is not good.”180  The narrative here is that despite fracking 
being a safe, beneficial activity, if one looks hard enough, one can find 
something to complain about.  Once again, the narrative allows pro-
fracking residents to simplify and dismiss contaminated water 
allegations made by others.181 
 
 175.  Interview with study participant 1321 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Interview with study participant 1212 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 178.  See Dvora Meyers, President of Gymnastics’ Athletes’ Commission Says Abuse Survivors 
Are In It For The Money, DEADSPIN (March 3, 2019, 1:30 PM), https://deadspin.com/president-
of-gymnastics-athletes-commission-says-abuse-1832990508 (reporting on various accusations that 
victims were making complaints in the hope of financial gain). 
 179.  Interview with study participant 1321 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 180.  Interview with study participant 1212 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 181.  This is not to suggest that many of the anti-fracking interviewees did not embrace shared 
narratives that tended to characterize and oversimplify.  
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Regardless of whether there have been only a handful of instances 
in which fracking activities actually led to water contamination, or 
whether there have been “thousands and thousands and thousands of 
other lives that they’ve affected,”182 the use of NDAs contributes to an 
atmosphere of uncertainty that allows dueling narratives to further 
muddy the waters. 
G. Retaliation and Other Disincentives to Filing Claims 
In addition to NDAs, the spread of information about sexual 
harassment is hindered by well-grounded concerns about retaliation, 
along with a lack of faith in the institutions meant to help victims.  
Many of those who have been subject to the kind of misconduct that 
sexual harassment laws and policies are meant to redress, elect not to 
avail themselves of those remedies for fear of other negative 
consequences that often result from doing so.  Although electing not 
to speak up about harassment allows serial harassers to persist in their 
behavior, one can hardly blame victims for remaining silent about what 
they have experienced. 
The fear of retaliation is a particularly powerful motivation to 
maintain silence, and one that is very rational.183  While lawmakers 
have created protections against retaliatory terminations in these 
situations,184 the retaliation a victim may face after speaking up can 
manifest in many other ways.185  Diminished support from management 
and social ostracization, for example, might arise in response to a 
sexual harassment claim.186  But such subtle behaviors would likely be 
difficult, if not impossible, to prove as part of a retaliation claim, 
rendering legal protection against retaliation of little value.187 
Although the emotional and psychological impacts people 
experience when harmed by fracking differ significantly from those 
experienced by sexual misconduct victims, the factors dissuading them 
from complaining or pursuing legal remedies bear some resemblance.  
One resident, for example, spoke of retaliation she experienced for 
complaining about noise, and subsequently, for speaking to the media.  
She said her initial complaints were ignored by the company and the 
township, but she was finally able to get a DEP representative to speak 
 
 182.  Interview with study participant 1014 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 183.  See Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 137 (listing the many forms retaliation may take). 
 184.  See id. at 137–38 (describing how a retaliatory termination can be challenged). 
 185.  Id. at 137. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 137–38. 
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to the well operators on her behalf.  “He went over there and talked to 
them and said, ‘you know what, can you at least let the people sleep a 
little bit, can you knock it off at around like 7 o’clock?’  That night, it 
was so loud, it seemed like it was worse.”188  Because the situation had 
not improved, and her husband, who was recovering from a heart 
attack and a stroke, could not get sufficient rest, she went to the local 
news with her story. 
Shortly thereafter, the well operator provided her with numbers 
to call if she had any further complaints. 
They’ve said, ‘if you have problems call us’ because I called the 
media the last time.  I don’t know if you found me on WXPI, it’s on 
there somewhere with me complaining about it.  And you also see all 
the gas well trolls writing nasty things about me underneath – ‘she’s 
probably just a welfare chick,’ … ‘looney tune will do anything for 
attention’ -- like I really wanted to have attention.189 
She noted that her daughter had actually tried to dissuade her 
from going on the news for fear of having the company or pro-fracking 
community members retaliate. 
Another resident, who experienced a variety of issues associated 
with a well on an adjacent property, also spoke of retaliation he faced 
in response to his complaints. 
You become a nuisance because you’re interfering with their 
activity, their production.  So you become the bad guy.  And then that’s 
when it all hits the fan.  You start out -- you’re a good guy if you leave 
them alone and don’t say nothing but wave, you’re a good neighbor.  
But soon as you have an issue with the dust, the traffic, getting run off 
the road, whatever it might be, spills, odors, dust, noise -- you’re now 
bad.  Then you’re labeled, then it starts: the bad guy, the terrorist, have 
me arrested, harassment -- they throw everything at you.190 
Alongside concerns about retaliation, some victims of sexual 
harassment might refrain from seeking redress because sexual 
harassment is so common that it is simply something they ultimately 
accept as part of life.191  That is, because women experience harassment 
in one form or another so frequently, it is not always clear what 
constitutes the kind of behavior that arises to the level of an actionable 
complaint.  Therefore, outside of the most egregious situations, many 
 
 188.  Interview with study participant 1233 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 189.  Interview with study participant 1233 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 190.  Interview with study participant 1402-B in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 191.  Akel, supra note 133, at 112. 
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targets of harassment simply accept that it is part of life, and endure.  
A similar mentality can be seen in how some residents in southwest 
Pennsylvania accept pollution as a given.  “The problem with this area 
is we’ve had industrialization, we’ve had the steel mills and the coal 
mines, and we’ve had this going on for years, and oil was discovered up 
in Tionesta or Titusville, wherever – and so people are kind of like, 
‘well, that’s just how things are.’”192  “[W]e kept running into that 
attitude: ‘oh you should have seen what it used to be like.’  And again, 
it’s not everybody but it was kind of like, you mention it to your 
neighbor, ‘hey you smell this?’  ‘Smell what?’  ‘The sulfur!  In the 
air.’”193 
Another reason that sexual harassment victims sometimes elect 
not to file a complaint comes from doubts about whether their claims 
will be believed.194  Because such allegations have often been treated 
with various degrees of skepticism, coming forward carries with it the 
potential for retaliation and other negative consequences, but without 
assurance that the offending behavior will be addressed.195  Therefore, 
if a victim questions whether her claim will be believed, or worries that 
the process will devolve into a he-said-she-said credibility contest, it 
reduces the incentive to speak up in the first place.  Likewise, not 
having their claims believed was a common theme amongst residents 
who had called gas company helplines to report issues.  One resident 
spoke of an incident in which he walked outside into a cloud of gas on 
his street, which immediately triggered a severe respiratory episode.  
When he got back inside and called the gas company, the 
representative “busted out laughing on the phone.”196  The 
representative then told him that because he had not gotten a call from 
the well site, what he experienced simply could not have happened.  
This resident was one of several interviewees to claim that 
representatives who answered the helplines summarily dismissed any 
concerns as impossible. 
Given the myriad disincentives outlined above, it is not surprising 
that researchers estimate that only 6 – 13% of sexual harassment 
victims file a formal complaint.197  This reluctance to engage with the 
 
 192.  Interview with study participant 1005 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 193.  Interview with study participant 1014 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 194.  Akel, supra note 133, at 108. 
 195.  Hébert, supra note 1, at 323. 
 196.  Interview with study participant 1420 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 197.  CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: REPORT 
OF CO-CHAIRS 11 (2016). 
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legal system or their companies’ internal compliance programs 
demonstrates a lack of trust in the institutions ostensibly in place to 
provide assistance in these situations.198   Studies have demonstrated 
the importance of trust in governments and institutions, and that the 
lack of trust can have significant negative repercussions.199  Because 
perpetrators are often powerful, economically valuable members of a 
company, victims cannot be blamed for being wary about seeking help 
from that company’s internal compliance program.  It is well 
established that victims often face negative employment outcomes 
after lodging complaints, while economically high-value perpetrators 
are protected.200  Some victims might reasonably conclude that if the 
organization does not value them as highly, it will not protect them.  
Counterintuitively, one study into sexual harassment reporting found 
that complaints from high-ranking victims were actually less likely to 
trigger an organizational response than those from lower-ranking 
employees.201  However, the researchers suspect that the reason for this 
is that high-ranking victims are necessarily harassed by even higher-
ranking employees, whom the organization would be the most 
motivated to protect.202 
H. Reduced Faith in Institutions 
Any mistrust that victims of sexual misconduct might feel towards 
institutions meant to render justice or protect them from retaliation 
would appear to be well-founded.  The failure of organizations to 
respond to sexual misconduct allegations has been demonstrated 
repeatedly in recent years.  In one of the most notorious examples, the 
failures of USA Gymnastics and Michigan State University to respond 
to complaints by gymnasts allowed Larry Nassar to sexually abuse 
minors for decades.203  Another recent proceeding revealed that a 
culture of secrecy, fostered by corporate executives, eventually 
convinced employees at Wynn Resorts to conclude that filing 
 
 198.  See Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 125–26 (describing the potential outcomes that may cause 
victims not to trust reporting procedures). 
 199.  Anne Marie Warren et al., Social Media Effects on Fostering Online Civic Engagement 
and Building Citizen Trust and Trust in Institutions, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. 291, 292 (2014). 
 200.  Hébert, supra note 1, at 322–24. 
 201.  Bergman, supra note 48, at 236. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Meyers, supra note 178. 
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complaints was pointless.204  Finally, court filings in a gender 
discrimination lawsuit filed against Microsoft revealed that out of 118 
gender discrimination complaints filed over the course of six years, the 
company considered only one to be “founded.”205 
That only one of the 118 gender discrimination complaints was 
taken seriously by Microsoft’s human resources department raises 
questions not unlike those raised by many residents in Pennsylvania, 
who allege that of the many water contamination complaints made to 
DEP, only a small percentage officially are ever linked to gas 
extraction activities.  These residents have very little faith that the 
state’s environmental enforcement agency is making good faith efforts 
to determine whether fracking operations are affecting their water.  
“They were pretty good, they ought to be counselors.  They feel for 
you, they’re going to do something about this, this is wrong, and report 
comes back, it’s always in favor of the industry.  There’s never no 
findings, nothing conclusive.  They’ve covered up.”206 
“I just told you, they’ll come out to people’s houses and say it’s not 
caused by fracking . . . I mean, because they’ve got their criteria very 
narrowly constructed, that they can – I mean, I’m sure they have a 
protocol that they follow, but how good, is that really making a good 
determination?”207  “Anyway, the DEP had sort of two tests they used.  
One was a full battery that included – it would cost a lot of money, but 
it would test for the fracking chemicals, which is what we all wanted to 
know.  They had another test which didn’t test for the fracking.  But 
they were using the test that specifically left out fracking-culpable type 
of chemicals, and then coming in saying, ‘your water is fine.’”208  “It 
says it can’t be from the drilling; it actually says at the end ‘while we 
don’t think it was the driller, you have serious problems with your 
water, and you should probably look into that.’  That’s what it says.  So 
[he]’s been in litigation for four years now.”209 
 
 204.  Ray Sanchez and Sonia Moghe, Wynn Resorts Executives Concealed Sexual Misconduct 
Accusations Against Steve Wynn, Gaming Regulators Say, CNN (Apr. 3, 2019 7:44 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/03/us/wynn-resorts-massachusetts-gaming-commission/index.html. 
 205.  Dan Levine, Microsoft Women Filed 238 Discrimination and Harassment Complaints, 
REUTERS (March 12, 2018 10:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-
women/microsoft-women-filed-238-discrimination-and-harassment-complaints-court-
documents-idUSKCN1GP077. 
 206.  Interview with study participant 1402-B in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 207.  Interview with study participant 0_1101 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 208.  Interview with study participant 1014 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 209.  Interview with study participant 1320 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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In fact, many residents, even some who support fracking, believe 
that Pennsylvania’s interest in generating revenue from gas extraction 
creates an incentive for the state to err on the side of gas companies 
when issues arise. 
And you know, DEP is about the business of permitting, making 
sure the permits go through, and they fill out the forms out right – and 
I mean, I have to say, I was pretty I about government before I got 
involved in this.  I thought the government would work for us – you 
know you get involved, you speak up, it’ll work for you.  And that’s not 
been my experience at all.  Especially when there’s money to be made 
at the state level.  And so the governors, all the governors I think, were 
wanting this.  They wanted it here, they wanted the economic benefits 
of it.210 
A consistent conclusion among fracking opponents is that the 
government institutions in place to protect the citizens have failed to 
do so.  “No way.  Nobody, not the local, clean to the feds.  There’s no 
help there at all.  None.”211  “The DEP permits the company down here 
taking waste in Masontown to completely dump the shit in there -- and 
issue another permit the next year.  How?  How?  Please tell me. These 
people aren’t here for us.  They’re not here for us.”212  Many residents’ 
dissatisfaction with Pennsylvania state agencies arose as a result of 
their own experiences, and some are eager to derisively declare that 
DEP actually stands for “don’t expect protection.”  But while some 
residents feel that DEP’s perceived shortcomings are the result of a 
lack of funding or manpower, others believe that they work to ensure 
that harms caused by the gas industry do not generate publicity: 
“people who notice that they’ve got water issues complain to DEP, and 
DEP, according to [investigative reporters],213 bury those complaints so 
as to make the whole notion of water issues associated with drilling 
appear to be much smaller than it really is.”214  Regardless of whether 
such allegations are true, many residents’ faith in governmental 
institutions has eroded as a result of their experiences with fracking. 
Even setting aside allegations that DEP is deliberately 
underreporting water contamination incidents in order to protect an 
 
 210.  Interview with study participant 1005 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 211.  Interview with study participant 1402-B in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 212.  Interview with study participant 1317 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 213.  TRIPLE DIVIDE (Bullfrog Films March 2013). 
 214.  Interview with study participant 1701 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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industry that is economically valuable to the state,215 many residents 
feel as though the gas industry gets special treatment. 
Like it’s a fact that the industry in Pennsylvania has been fined 
over 3,000 times -- fined over 3,000 times -- that’s just when they’ve 
been caught for infractions.  Like, how many times have they got away 
with it?  But back to the 3,000, it’s hard to think of many other 
industries that that would be allowed -- that lawmakers would put up 
with those kinds of tallies.  And yet they do, because the . . . money 
sustaining, creating that kind of power . . . .216 
The feeling that the state government prioritized the tax revenue 
generated by fracking over the health of its citizens was common 
among interviewees. 
I. Realities of Litigation 
While internal reporting systems do not appeal to many sexual 
harassment victims for the reasons outlined above, the legal system 
does not necessarily offer a better option.  Pursuing redress via the 
courts can be an expensive endeavor, and concerns about legal fees 
keep some victims from considering it as an option.217  Furthermore, 
the prospect of getting into a he-said-she-said conflict might dissuade 
some attorneys from taking the case.218  The same might be said for 
prosecutors considering criminal charges, as they may be wary of 
getting into a credibility contest.219  Similar concerns about financial 
repercussions and lawyer availability also discourage some people who 
have been harmed by fracking activities from engaging with the legal 
system. 
Many people near fracking operations in rural Pennsylvania live 
at the edge of poverty, and perceptions of legal fees are a powerful 
disincentive.  “They think it will probably cost them more money than 
they can make because they need an attorney and all that kind of 
stuff.”220  Hearing residents who have been harmed speak so 
pessimistically about their prospects of being made whole contrasts 
sharply with those who suggested that water contamination claims are 
 
 215.  See id. 
 216.  Interview with study participant 1902-A in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 217.  Akel, supra note 133, at 108. 
 218.  See Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 137–38 (noting that because plaintiff attorneys generally 
work on a contingency-fee basis they must be convinced that the case is a strong one). 
 219.  Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual 
Regulation, 113 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 825, 857–58 (2019). 
 220.  Interview with study participant 5_1143 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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cynical sue-and-settle schemes meant to defraud the gas companies.  
One landowner, who had actually filed a lawsuit, outlined his 
understanding of the financial situation: 
Okay, so if you do get somebody that works on a contingency 
basis, it’s 40%.  Okay, so you take 40%.  First of all, medical is out of 
the question.  Trying to prove medical, this is still too new.  Ain’t 
happening, ain’t happening.  My opinion.  So you go nuisance, you 
know what your tax bracket is on nuisance?  You pay 35%.  So if you 
sue for $100,000, you’re getting a lawyer 40, and 35 for the feds.  You 
end up with $25,000, and then in the end they want to sign everything 
away, all your rights for any kind of medical – it ain’t happening.  In 
nuisance, it’s small money.  It might sound good, say you’re getting 
$100,000, but you ain’t getting 100, you’re gonna get 25.  So how’s it 
even helping you?  And now you gotta sign away that they can rape 
you again.221 
This interviewee still pursued a claim, not because he thought he 
would be financially better for it, or that his injuries would be 
compensated.  Instead, he hoped to get his “day in court,” and to make 
what happened to him part of the public record.  He was very critical 
of the use of NDAs to keep gas company reputations clean, and wanted 
more than anything to bring attention to the widespread harms for 
which he considered the industry responsible. 
The expense of litigation, coupled with pessimism about what 
could actually be recovered via litigation, may explain, to an extent, 
why some landowners have been unable to secure representation for 
nuisance actions.  One man who, based on the evidence he produced 
during the interview, appeared to have an actionable claim, also 
produced four letters from different attorneys or firms declining to 
represent him.  Although these letters did not specify why they were 
declining to represent him, the high cost of litigating his case and the 
low probability of prevailing might have played a role.  Other 
interviewees also claimed that landowners struggled to find attorneys 
to represent them, speculating that local attorneys are conflicted out 
due to industry ties.  “So a lot of attorneys end up working for oil and 
gas.  So then, if you’re trying to say they are doing some wrongdoing to 
you, there are not many attorneys that have the capacity to take those 
new cases on, because they are already booked.”222 
 
 221.  Interview with study participant 1402-B in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 222.  Interview with study participant 1556 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
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Setting aside any financial concerns, many instances of sexual 
harassment would be difficult, if not impossible to prove in court.223  
Many forms or instances of sexual harassment inherently leave little, if 
any, tangible evidence.  Without such evidence, and without a 
corroborating witness, claimants struggle to prove their claims in court.  
Awareness of this difficulty dissuades some victims from seeking 
redress via the court.  Similarly, the challenges in proving causation in 
a water contamination case have not been lost on many residents 
whose water has gone bad. 
“Based on DEP’s way of thinking at the time, there was no -- . . . 
and the legal way of thinking was since the water hadn’t been tested 
before, there was no proof it was because of the oil companies.  The 
chemicals obviously didn’t come from anywhere else.  These people 
lived there for a long time and never gotten sick, so it was ridiculous.  
It was just one of those legal loophole things.”224  “Well I’ve just seen 
it in other cases down in Washington County and another case here in 
Butler County.  And, it’s just a very difficult thing to prove.  You know, 
because we’re dealing with scientific and expert analysis, etcetera, 
etcetera.  And I think the deck is stacked against the individual.”225  
None of the residents interviewed for this study were attorneys,226 and 
their understandings of causation or burdens of proof were predictably 
varied.  But nearly all were consistent in believing that proving a 
sufficient connection between contaminated water and a particular 
fracking well, so as to prevail in litigation, would be unlikely. 
III. Possible Solutions In the Fracking Context 
Despite the strange parallels that the systematic use of NDAs has 
helped create between sexual misconduct claims and water 
contamination claims, addressing each issue requires taking into 
account the nuances of each context.  Scholars had previously analyzed 
the NDA problem, but the recent surge of attention to their use in 
sexual misconduct settlements has prompted more scholarship, and 
thus, more proposed solutions.  Drawing on those proposals, this 
Article focuses on how similar solutions might alleviate some of the 
negative consequences of systematic use of NDAs in the fracking 
context. 
 
 223.  See Mizrahi, supra note 6, at 139 (listing variables that may make it difficult to prove 
harassment in court). 
 224.  Interview with study participant 1014 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 225.  Interview with study participant 1102 in Pa. (Summer, 2018). 
 226.  One interviewee had worked as a paralegal in a Pittsburgh law firm. 
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A. Legislative Solutions 
Because the #MeToo movement gained so much publicity, it 
galvanized legislators into passing or proposing legislation to minimize 
the harmful impacts of NDAs, something that has not happened in the 
fracking context.  It makes sense, then, to first examine a sampling of 
those legislative efforts and analyze their likely effectiveness in each 
context.  At the federal level, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
contains a provision that states: “[n]o deduction shall be allowed under 
this chapter for (1) any settlement or payment related to sexual 
harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement or payment is subject to 
a nondisclosure agreement, or (2) attorney’s fees related to such a 
settlement or payment.”227  Although this new provision does not 
restrict or render unenforceable nondisclosure provisions in 
settlements, it does make them more expensive.  The effect this 
provision will have on the number of settlements containing NDAs 
remains to be seen, but one study estimated that from 2010-2016, 
employers paid out almost $700 million via the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s administrative enforcement prelitigation 
process, which would not account for settlements outside of that 
context.228 
Another piece of federal legislation that has been introduced is 
the Sunlight in the Workplace Harassment Act (“Sunshine Act”),229 
which would require publicly held companies to disclose the number 
of settlements and total amount paid to settle sexual misconduct 
claims.230  The Sunshine Act, as introduced, does not apply to privately 
held companies, such as the Weinstein Company, so its effectiveness 
would be limited.231  But this type of mandatory disclosure legislation 
would improve, to an extent, the accuracy of statistics related to sexual 
misconduct in the workplace, and would draw attention to those 
companies with a particularly high frequency of complaints.  However, 
it might not create enough of an incentive to avoid using NDAs when 
high-profile executives are involved. 
Were the Sunshine Act to be passed, the information generated 
would still be valuable, and it could ultimately serve as a model for a 
similar disclosure bill addressing settlements arising from fracking 
claims.  But in order to effectively address the nuances of the fracking 
 
 227.  26 U.S.C. § 162(q) (West 2018). 
 228.  Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 19, at 184. 
 229.  Sunlight in Workplace Harassment Act, S. 2454, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 230.  Aronson, supra note 21, at 1206–07. 
 231.  Id. at 1208. 
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context, such a bill would need to break down the required disclosures 
into, for example, categories of alleged injury, such as water 
contamination, and geographical information, such as the number of 
claims made per county.  Doing so would provide at least some 
information about those companies that have the worst track records 
in terms of the number and severity of incidents, which would be useful 
for landowners who are considering signing leases. At the same time, 
legislators and government agencies would gain a better understanding 
of the risks fracking poses to human health and the environment.  
Although companies sometimes prefer to dispose of claims through 
settlement, even when they are not at fault, the additional information 
generated by this kind of disclosure law would be of considerable 
value. 
At the state level, as noted above, several bills have been proposed 
or passed that directly aim to limit or eliminate the use of NDAs in 
settlements arising out of sexual misconduct claims.232  Scholars who 
have analyzed these bills have mixed opinions when forecasting their 
ultimate effectiveness.  For example, although California’s SB820 
renders unenforceable those NDAs arising out of claims filed in court 
or in an administrative proceeding, it does not address pre-filing 
claims.233  Thus, those harassers who move quickly to reach an 
agreement before a claim is filed can still include an NDA that allows 
them to keep their conduct from being publicized.234  A similar bill 
passed in New York, which effectively prohibits NDAs that victims do 
not affirmatively agree to after a post-negotiation waiting period.235  
But while the New York rule might mitigate the coercive bargaining 
tactics that lead many victims to agree reluctantly to NDAs, it does not 
protect third parties who might be similarly harmed by a harasser 
whose actions have been concealed.236 
With regard to NDAs in the fracking context, some states 
currently have laws that render unenforceable any contract provision 
that conceals a public hazard or environmental hazard.237  Laws such as 
these would seem to offer a simple solution to the problem, provided 
they are carefully drafted to encompass settlements that implicate the 
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kinds of issues landowners have had with fracking operations.  
However, given the economic benefits fracking can bring to a state, it 
might prove politically infeasible to pass such legislation in fracking-
heavy states.  It seems unlikely, for example, that the Republican-
controlled Pennsylvania legislature would pass a bill specifically 
tailored to keeping gas companies from being able to enforce NDAs. 
Another concern with broadly rendering NDAs unenforceable by 
statute is that it may serve as a disincentive to settlement for the party 
most financially able to sustain prolonged litigation.  Along similar 
lines, many defendants consider the privacy benefits of an NDA to be 
worth paying additional compensation to plaintiffs.  Therefore, 
knowing that an NDA would be unenforceable will take away that 
privacy incentive, and lead to lower settlements for plaintiffs.  In that 
sense, a solution that benefits third parties and society at large would 
lead to injured parties being compensated less.  However, given the 
asymmetric bargaining power, as well as the value some claimants put 
on being able to discuss their experiences, it is not clear how much this 
balance would shift were NDAs not available as points of negotiation. 
B. Judicial Solutions 
Even without such legislation, courts could simply apply the 
Restatement balancing test, and find NDA provisions to be void as 
against public policy.238  The arguments for doing so, as discussed 
above, are compelling in each context.239  This approach allows the 
parties to contract as they wish, while still maintaining privacy and 
confidentiality if it is in their interests to do so.  If, however, claimants 
subsequently decide to speak about their experiences, they will not be 
penalized for it.  One advantage of this approach is that instead of 
requiring political action, courts would simply address these cases as 
they come. 
But relying on courts to find NDAs unenforceable creates 
unpredictability for both parties.  Defendants willing to pay extra for a 
promise of silence would not have sufficient assurances that this 
promise will be kept.  On the other hand, claimants choosing to speak 
up in spite of an NDA would have to trust that a court reviewing the 
issue, and analyzing the public policy exception, would find in their 
favor.  Furthermore, as is the case with the legislative approach, 
defendants who harbor doubts that an NDA will be enforced, might be 
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less inclined to settle in the first place.  Furthermore, if claimants elect 
to honor the NDA, and remain silent about their experiences, third 
parties lose the benefit of information that might protect them from 
similar harm.  Thus, claimants gain the right to express themselves if 
they so choose, but this solution does not necessarily address the third-
party externality issue.240 
C. Partial Disclosure Requirement 
Instead of rendering NDAs unenforceable legislatively or 
judicially, states could condition their enforceability on the submission 
of reports detailing the underlying claims.  These reports would contain 
details regarding the nature of the claim, as well as an approximate 
location, but would omit additional identifying details.  Upon 
submission, a state department of environmental protection241 would 
both publish the details of these reports on their website, and aggregate 
data from all such reports to be published in a user-friendly manner.  
Creation of this kind of database would respect parties’ contractual 
expectations and preserve privacy, yet would not enable suppression 
of information regarding public health and environmental risks.  
Therefore, the goal of the public policy exception to contract 
enforcement – protecting the public from risk of harm – would be met 
without reducing the parties’ incentive to settle or diminishing their 
privacy expectations. 
D. Combining the Solutions 
Given the myriad, and often conflicting, interests involved, the 
ideal path forward would be to adopt a combination of the solutions 
that have been presented above.  This Article proposes adopting 
comprehensive federal and state sunshine laws for the fracking context, 
along with the establishment of incident information databases.  This 
combination maximizes the information available to third parties, 
which addresses the most problematic repercussions of NDAs, while 
minimizing burdens on privacy and the freedom to contract. 
Sunshine laws that require companies to report the number of 
claims and the amount of money paid to settle fracking-related claims, 
provided they were subject to an NDA, would serve the same purposes 
as other information disclosure laws.  They would allow the public and 
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market forces to exert pressure on companies, they would provide 
information to legislatures about the extent of these issues, and they 
would alert investigative authorities of those entities with particularly 
poor performance.  Likewise, maintaining a database that details the 
nature of underlying claims would have similar effects, while also 
providing the kind of risk information that members of the general 
public would find most useful.  Setting aside the political challenges 
involved in passing this kind of legislation, the fracking context has a 
particular need for increased information availability. 
CONCLUSION 
That such wildly dissimilar situations as sexual misconduct and 
fracking nevertheless have so much in common highlights the 
fundamental problem with using the freedom to contract to hide public 
hazards.  But this Article does mean to suggest that all NDAs should 
be rendered unenforceable.  The use of NDAs to protect intellectual 
property or trade secrets, for example, can be a perfectly valid exercise 
of the freedom to contract.242  The concerns and remedies addressed 
here apply only to situations in which third parties might be harmed as 
a result of an NDA concealing information that implicates a public 
safety risk.  For those arising out of medical malpractice, products 
liability, or other contexts where the potential for concealment of 
public safety risks is higher, it may also be possible to condition their 
enforceability on the establishment of information-forcing mechanisms 
like the one proposed above for fracking. 
How such a mechanism would be tailored to fit those contexts is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but extending the notion of 
conditioning enforceability in this manner may be worth considering.  
By keeping in mind those who are not party to the contract, yet may be 
hurt by its enforcement, courts and policymakers can balance the 
freedom to contract with the importance of making available 
information relevant to public health and safety. 
 
 
 242.  However, many residents felt strongly that fracking operators who avail themselves of 
trade secret protections to protect the precise composition of fracking fluids are doing so in a bad 
faith attempt to conceal the hazardous nature of these fluids. 
